Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power

47 Pages Posted: 24 Feb 2018 Last revised: 21 Sep 2018

See all articles by Suresh Naidu

Suresh Naidu

Columbia University

Eric A. Posner

University of Chicago - Law School

E. Glen Weyl

Plural Technology Collaboratory, Microsoft Research Special Projects; Plurality Institute; GETTING-Plurality Research Network

Date Written: February 23, 2018


Recent research indicates that labor market power has contributed to wage inequality and economic stagnation. Although the antitrust laws prohibit firms from restricting competition in labor markets like in product markets, the government does little to address the labor market problem and private litigation has been rare and mostly unsuccessful. The reason is that the analytic methods for evaluating labor market power in antitrust contexts are primitive, far less sophisticated than the legal rules used to judge product market power. To remedy this asymmetry, we propose methods for judging the effects of mergers on labor markets. We also extend our approach to other forms of anticompetitive practices undertaken by employers against workers. We highlight some arguments and evidence indicating that market power may be even more important in labor than in product markets.

Keywords: monopsony, antitrust, merger analysis, matching

JEL Classification: D43, J42, L41, K21

Suggested Citation

Naidu, Suresh and Posner, Eric A. and Weyl, Eric Glen, Antitrust Remedies for Labor Market Power (February 23, 2018). Harvard Law Review, Forthcoming, University of Chicago Coase-Sandor Institute for Law & Economics Research Paper No. 850, U of Chicago, Public Law Working Paper No. 665, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper, Available at SSRN: or

Suresh Naidu

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Eric A. Posner

University of Chicago - Law School ( email )

1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-0425 (Phone)
773-702-0730 (Fax)


Eric Glen Weyl (Contact Author)

Plural Technology Collaboratory, Microsoft Research Special Projects ( email )

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Cambridge, MA 02139
United States
8579984513 (Phone)


Plurality Institute ( email )

GETTING-Plurality Research Network ( email )

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Suite 520N
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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