The Civil Judge As Risk Regulator

Forthcoming, European Journal of Risk Regulation

Tilburg Private Law Working Paper Series No. 01/2018

Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 06/2018

14 Pages Posted: 6 Mar 2018

See all articles by M.A. Loth

M.A. Loth

Tilburg University - Private Law Department

Tilburg University Law Submitter

Tilburg University; Tilburg University - Criminal Law Department

Date Written: February 27, 2018

Abstract

Taking the Urgenda-case on climate change liability as an example, this article researches the more general question into the legitimacy of risk regulation by civil courts. Which principles determine the legitimacy of a civil court’s participation, especially in the domain of societal risk regulation? The central claim is that these principles concern (amongst many other things) the position of the court, the tools of the court, and the attitude of the court. In other words, they have their source in constitutional law, civil (procedural) law, and professional ethics respectively. This claim is substantiated by an analysis of these principles, their interpretation, and the way they contribute to a normative/theoretical framework for the assessment of the legitimacy of judicial rulings.

Keywords: Urgenda, civil law, courts, climate change, risk regulation

Suggested Citation

Loth, Marc and Submitter, Tilburg University Law, The Civil Judge As Risk Regulator (February 27, 2018). Forthcoming, European Journal of Risk Regulation; Tilburg Private Law Working Paper Series No. 01/2018 ; Tilburg Law School Research Paper No. 06/2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3130590 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3130590

Marc Loth (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Private Law Department ( email )

Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University Law Submitter

Tilburg University ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, DC 5000 LE
Netherlands

Tilburg University - Criminal Law Department ( email )

Netherlands

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