One Myth of the Classical Natural Law Theory: Reflecting on the 'Thin' View of Legal Positivism

24 Pages Posted: 1 Mar 2018

See all articles by Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco

Veronica Rodriguez-Blanco

University of Surrey - Centre for Law and Philosophy

pilar zambrano

University of Navarra

Date Written: March 2018

Abstract

Much controversy has emerged on the demarcation between legal positivism and non‐legal positivism with some authors calling for a ban on the ‐as they see it‐ nonsensical labelling of legal philosophical debates. We agree with these critics; simplistic labelling cannot replace the work of sophisticated and sound argumentation. In this paper we do not use the term ‘legal positivism’ as a simplistic label but identify a specific position which we consider to be the most appealing and plausible view on legal positivism. This is the view advocated by Gardner in his paper 'Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths’ (Gardner [Gardner, J., 2001], 199), where he carefully scrutinises the most convincing and unifying postulates of legal positivism, which he calls “the thin view”. The study shows that this thin view presupposes an empirical conception of action that is untenable and implausible since it makes acts of engagement with the law unintelligible to an observer of such acts.

Suggested Citation

Rodriguez‐Blanco, Veronica and zambrano, pilar, One Myth of the Classical Natural Law Theory: Reflecting on the 'Thin' View of Legal Positivism (March 2018). Ratio Juris, Vol. 31, Issue 1, pp. 9-32, 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3132103 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/raju.12196

Veronica Rodriguez‐Blanco (Contact Author)

University of Surrey - Centre for Law and Philosophy ( email )

Guildford
Guildford, Surrey GU2 5XH
United Kingdom

Pilar Zambrano

University of Navarra ( email )

Camino del Cerro del Aguila, 3
Pamplona, Navarra 31080
Spain

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