Intermediated Social Preferences: Altruism in an Algorithmic Era

Advances in Economics of Religion, Volume 158, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

23 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2018 Last revised: 18 Dec 2018

See all articles by Daniel L. Chen

Daniel L. Chen

Directeur de Recherche, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France

Date Written: 2018

Abstract

What are the consequences of intermediating moral responsibility through complex organizations or transactions? This paper examines individual decision-making when choices are known to be obfuscated under randomization. It reports the results of a data entry experiment in an online labor market. Individuals enter data, grade another individual’s work, and decide to split a bonus. However, before they report their decision, they are randomized into settings with different degrees of intermediation. The key finding is that less generosity results when graders are told the split might be implemented by a new procurement algorithm. Those whose decisions are averaged or randomly selected among a set of graders are more generous relative to the a social treatment. These findings relate to “the great transformation” whereby moral mentalities are shaped by modes of (a)social interaction.

Keywords: moral responsibility; decision-making; moral mentalities; altruism; social preferences

JEL Classification: K00, P00

Suggested Citation

Chen, Daniel L., Intermediated Social Preferences: Altruism in an Algorithmic Era (2018). Advances in Economics of Religion, Volume 158, Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3134593

Daniel L. Chen (Contact Author)

Directeur de Recherche, Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Toulouse School of Economics, Institute for Advanced Study in Toulouse, University of Toulouse Capitole, Toulouse, France ( email )

21 allée de Brienne
31015 Toulouse cedex 6 France
Toulouse, 31015
France

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