China's and India's Differing Investment Treaty and Dispute Settlement Experiences and Implications for Africa

Loyola of Chicago Law Journal Vol. 49, p. 406 (2018)

73 Pages Posted: 9 Mar 2018

Date Written: March 6, 2018

Abstract

This Article examines China’s and India’s differing investment treaty and dispute settlement experiences and the resulting implications for Africa. It attempts to answer the question of whether there is evidence of China’s and India’s attempt to take advantage of the default structural imbalance enabled by centuries of international investment laws and institutions that favor the investor. The Article begins by presenting the background of the current economic reality and trends that necessitate the evaluation of the existing rules and institutions. It then presents a detailed assessment of this phenomenon by focusing on the investment cases brought against India for context, followed by a critical appraisal of India’s reaction to the perceived deficiencies of the existing system as evidenced by its new BIT Model Text and the text’s implications for Africa. Next, the Article evaluates the most important body of evidence that comes in the form of bilateral investment treaties, i.e., China’s and India’s investment treaties with African states. Finally, it offers a summary of conclusions.

Keywords: China-Africa Investment, India-Africa Investment, China-Africa Treaties, India-Africa Treaties, International dispute settlement, Investment arbitration, Bilateral Investment Treaties, BITs China-Africa-India law, trade, and investment

Suggested Citation

Kidane, Won, China's and India's Differing Investment Treaty and Dispute Settlement Experiences and Implications for Africa (March 6, 2018). Loyola of Chicago Law Journal Vol. 49, p. 406 (2018), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3135581

Won Kidane (Contact Author)

Villanova University ( email )

Villanova, PA 19085
United States

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