Collective Experimentation: A Laboratory Study

30 Pages Posted: 12 Mar 2018

See all articles by Mikhail Freer

Mikhail Freer

University of Essex, Department of Economics

César Martinelli

George Mason University - Department of Economics

Siyu Wang

Wichita State University - W. Frank Barton School of Business - Department of Economics

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Date Written: January 18, 2018

Abstract

We develop a simple model of collective experimentation and take it to the lab. In equilibrium, as in the recent work of Strulovici (2010), majority rule has a bias toward under experimentation, as good news for a minority of voters may lead a majority of voters to abandon a policy when each of them thinks it is likely that the policy will be passed by a future majority excluding them. We compare the behavior in the lab of groups under majority rule and under the optimal voting rule, which precludes voting in intermediate stages of the policy experiment. Surprisingly, simple majority performs better than the (theoretically) optimal voting rule. Majority rule seems to be more robust than other forms of voting when players make mistakes.

Suggested Citation

Freer, Mikhail and Martinelli, César and Wang, Siyu, Collective Experimentation: A Laboratory Study (January 18, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3135739 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3135739

Mikhail Freer (Contact Author)

University of Essex, Department of Economics ( email )

Wivenhoe Park
Colchester CO4 3SQ
United Kingdom

César Martinelli

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Siyu Wang

Wichita State University - W. Frank Barton School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )

Wichita, KS 67260-0078
United States

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