Lying, Deception, and fMRI: A Critical Update

Neurolaw and Responsibility for Action (Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov ed., Cambridge University Press, 2018 Forthcoming)

U of Alabama Legal Studies Research Paper No. 3136053

24 Pages Posted: 8 Mar 2018 Last revised: 16 Mar 2018

Michael S. Pardo

University of Alabama School of Law

Date Written: 2018

Abstract

This chapter discusses recent studies on fMRI-based lie detection. In Minds, Brains, and Law, Dennis Patterson and I examined the scholarly literature and judicial opinions on the topic, and we discussed several empirical and conceptual issues affecting the use of such evidence in legal settings. In this chapter, I focus on two conceptual issues and examine several studies that have been published since the publication of our book. The conceptual issues concern: (1) the distinction between deception and lying, and (2) the concept of lying itself (or the criteria for what constitutes a lie). As with the array of studies that we examined previously, the more-recent studies also face serious limitations because of these issues.

Keywords: lie detection, deception, neuroscience, brain, fMRI, United States v. Semrau, empirical, conceptual

Suggested Citation

Pardo, Michael S., Lying, Deception, and fMRI: A Critical Update (2018). Neurolaw and Responsibility for Action (Bebhinn Donnelly-Lazarov ed., Cambridge University Press, 2018 Forthcoming); U of Alabama Legal Studies Research Paper No. 3136053. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3136053

Michael S. Pardo (Contact Author)

University of Alabama School of Law ( email )

P.O. Box 870382
Tuscaloosa, AL 35487
United States

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