29 Pages Posted: 24 May 2002 Last revised: 10 May 2009
This article defends, and further develops, our earlier work on regulatory competition and takeover law. We have argued that competition for corporate charters provides incentives to states to protect incumbent managers from hostile takeovers, and that the empirical evidence is consistent with this account. To improve the performance of regulatory competition, we have put forward the possibility of choice-enhancing federal intervention; such intervention would expand shareholder choice, and encourage states to become more attentive to shareholder interests, without imposing any mandatory arrangements. Replying to Jonathan Macey's response to our work in this issue of the Business Lawyer, we show that none of his claims weakens our analysis.
The earlier work which we defend and develop in this paper is "A New Approach to Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition," 87 Virginia Law Review 111-164 (2001). In a related piece ("Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice," 87 Virginia Law Review 993-1006 (2001)), we reply to a critique of our work by Steve Choi and Andrew Guzman.
Keywords: Delaware, incorporations, corporate charters, regulatory competition, corporate governance, managers, shareholders, takeovers
JEL Classification: G30, G38, H70, K22
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Ferrell, Allen, On Takeover Law and Regulatory Competition. Business Lawyer, Vol. 57, pp. 1047-1068, 2002; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 363, 2002. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=313828 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.313828