Costly State Verification and Debt Contracts: A Critical Resume

30 Pages Posted: 31 Oct 2002

See all articles by Andrea Attar

Andrea Attar

Toulouse School of Economics; University of Roma Tor Vergata

Eloisa Campioni

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance

Date Written: May 2002

Abstract

This paper presents a critical review of the role of the Costly State Verification framework in financial contracting.

Keywords: Mechanism Design, Costly State Verification, Optimal Debt Contracts

JEL Classification: D82, G30

Suggested Citation

Attar, Andrea and Campioni, Eloisa, Costly State Verification and Debt Contracts: A Critical Resume (May 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=314060 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.314060

Andrea Attar

Toulouse School of Economics

21, allée de Brienne
Toulouse, F 31000
France
+33 5 61128578 (Phone)

University of Roma Tor Vergata ( email )

2 Via Columbia
00100 Rome
Italy

Eloisa Campioni (Contact Author)

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Dept. of Economics and Finance ( email )

Italy

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
254
Abstract Views
1,510
rank
129,134
PlumX Metrics