Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation

101 Pages Posted: 23 Mar 2018 Last revised: 11 May 2018

Date Written: January 2, 2017

Abstract

When transferee judges receive a multidistrict proceeding, they select a few lead plaintiffs’ lawyers to efficiently manage litigation and settlement negotiations. That decision gives those attorneys total control over all consolidated plaintiffs’ claims and rewards them richly in common-benefit fees. It’s no surprise then that these are coveted positions, yet empirical evidence confirms that the same attorneys occupy them time and again.

Anytime repeat players exist and exercise both oligopolistic leadership control across multidistrict proceedings and monopolistic power within a single proceeding, there is concern that they will use their dominance to enshrine practices and norms that benefit themselves at consumers’ (or here, clients’) expense. Apprehensiveness should in-crease when defense lawyers are repeat players too, as they are in multidistrict litigation. And anxiety may peak when the circumstances exhibit these anticompetitive characteristics, but lack regulation as they do here. Without the safeguards built into class certification, judicial monitoring and appellate checks disappear. What remains is a system that may permit lead lawyers to act, at times, like a cartel.

Basic economic principles demonstrate that noncompetitive markets can result in higher prices and lower outputs, and agency costs chronicle ways in which unmonitored agents’ self-interest can lead them astray. By analyzing lead lawyers’ common-benefit fees, the nonclass deals that they design, and the results they generate for their clients, this Article introduces new empirical evidence that multidistrict litigation is not immune to market or agency principles. It demonstrates that repeat players on both sides continually achieve their goals in tandem — defendants end massive suits and lead plaintiffs’ lawyers increase their common-benefit fees. But this exchange may result in lower payouts to plaintiffs, stricter evidentiary burdens in claims processing, or more coercive plaintiff-participation measures in master settlements.

These circumstances warrant regulation. Even though judges entrench and enable re-peat players, they are integral to the solution. By tinkering with selection and compensation methods and instilling automatic remands after leaders negotiate master settlements, judges can capitalize on competitive forces already in play. Tapping into the vibrant rivalries within the plaintiffs’ bar allows judges to use dynamic market solutions to remap the existing regulatory landscape by invigorating competition and playing to attorneys’ adversarial strengths.

Keywords: MDL, plaintiff steering committee, attorneys' fees, procedure, mass torts, common-benefit fees, competition, products liability

JEL Classification: K10, K13, K40, K41

Suggested Citation

Burch, Elizabeth Chamblee, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation (January 2, 2017). 70 Vanderbilt Law Review 67 (2017); University of Georgia School of Law Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2018-22. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3144457

Elizabeth Chamblee Burch (Contact Author)

University of Georgia Law School ( email )

225 Herty Drive
Athens, GA 30602
United States

HOME PAGE: http://https://www.law.uga.edu/profile/elizabeth-chamblee-burch

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