Information Design: A Unified Perspective

71 Pages Posted: 25 Mar 2018

See all articles by Dirk Bergemann

Dirk Bergemann

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics; Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Stephen Morris

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Multiple version iconThere are 5 versions of this paper

Date Written: March 20, 2018

Abstract

Given a game with uncertain payoffs, information design analyzes the extent to which the provision of information alone can influence the behavior of the players. Information design has a literal interpretation, under which there is a real information designer who can commit to the choice of the best information structure (from her perspective) for a set of participants in a game. We emphasize a metaphorical interpretation, under which the information design problem is used by the analyst to characterize play in the game under many different information structures.

We provide an introduction into the basic issues and insights of a rapidly growing literature in information design. We show how the literal and metaphorical interpretations of information design unify a large body of existing work, including that on communication in games (Myerson (1991)), Bayesian persuasion (Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011)) and some of our own recent work on robust predictions in games of incomplete information.

Keywords: Information design, Bayesian persuasion, Correlated equilibrium, Incomplete information, Robust predictions, Information structure

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83

Suggested Citation

Bergemann, Dirk and Morris, Stephen Edward, Information Design: A Unified Perspective (March 20, 2018). Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 2075R3. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3145000 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3145000

Dirk Bergemann (Contact Author)

Yale University - Cowles Foundation - Department of Economics ( email )

28 Hillhouse Ave
New Haven, CT 06520-8268
United States
203-432-3592 (Phone)
203-432-2128 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.yale.edu/~dirk/

Yale University - Cowles Foundation

Box 208281
New Haven, CT 06520-8281
United States

Stephen Edward Morris

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Princeton, NJ 08544-1021
United States

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