Trade Associations, Information Exchange, and Cartels

17 Pages Posted: 27 Mar 2018

See all articles by Spencer Weber Waller

Spencer Weber Waller

Loyola University Chicago School of Law

Date Written: March 22, 2018


This issue paper is from the forthcoming Antitrust Marathon VI: Compliance Matters. The issue paper and the hypothetical problem it contains were the basis for a round table table discussion with practitioners, professors, and enforcers from the US, UK, EU and other jurisdictions which took place at the Hungarian Competition Authority in October, 2017. The special symposium issue of the Loyola Consumer Law Review will contain the full papers and edited transcripts of the discussions that followed.

Trade associations can play a procompetitive role in an economy but, as an association of actual and potential competitors, can also raise important competition law issues that must be addressed carefully by legal counsel. This Issue Paper presents a hypothetical problem that illustrates many of the issues that counsel can confront in representing a trade association, its members, or company executives. The Issue Paper raises many of the issues from a United States’ perspective with occasional comparative examples from other jurisdictions. Carefully consider how your jurisdiction would, and should, address these all too real issues. In thinking about the competition law and best practices in your jurisdiction, also consider how the best legal advice possible will be subverted unless there is a true culture of compliance in the industry, enterprises, and employees in question.

Keywords: trade associations, information exchanges, cartels, antitrust, competition law, compliance, advisory opinions, business review letters, Antitrust Division, Federal Trade Commission

JEL Classification: K20, K21, K40, K41, K42, L40, L44

Suggested Citation

Waller, Spencer Weber, Trade Associations, Information Exchange, and Cartels (March 22, 2018). Loyola Consumer Law Review, Vol. 30, 2018. Available at SSRN:

Spencer Weber Waller (Contact Author)

Loyola University Chicago School of Law ( email )

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