The Influence of Socialist Principles on the Legal Regulation of Markets in China: The Anti-Monopoly Law

Forthcoming, Hualing Fu et al (eds), Socialist Law in Socialist East Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2018)

Posted: 30 Mar 2018

See all articles by Wendy Ng

Wendy Ng

University of Melbourne - Law School

Date Written: March 24, 2018

Abstract

At the same time as using market mechanisms to allocate resources and coordinate economic outcomes in its market economy, China remains committed to the socialist system. In particular, the leadership of the Party and the dominance of public ownership, which are principles that are fundamental to socialism in China, means that the state directly participates in and regulates the market economy. To explore the ways in which market regulation is shaped by the dynamics of the relationship, interaction, and tension between socialist and market principles within China’s economy, this paper examines China’s competition law. Competition law is used to regulate markets, maintaining and protecting their competitiveness and ensuring their proper functioning. Examining its role and operation in an economy in which the state plays key functions provides important insights into understanding whether and how socialist principles influence competition law and the legal regulation of markets in China.

Keywords: anti-monopoly law, competition law, socialist principles, socialist market economy, state-owned enterprises, macroeconomic control, market regulation

JEL Classification: K21, P37, P21, P26

Suggested Citation

Ng, Wendy, The Influence of Socialist Principles on the Legal Regulation of Markets in China: The Anti-Monopoly Law (March 24, 2018). Forthcoming, Hualing Fu et al (eds), Socialist Law in Socialist East Asia (Cambridge University Press, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3148452

Wendy Ng (Contact Author)

University of Melbourne - Law School ( email )

University Square
185 Pelham Street, Carlton
Victoria, Victoria 3010
Australia

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