Decentralizing the Stochastic Growth Model

32 Pages Posted: 4 Jun 2002

See all articles by Jean-Pierre Danthine

Jean-Pierre Danthine

University of Lausanne - Institute of Banking and Finance (IBF); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); Swiss Finance Institute

John B. Donaldson

Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics

Date Written: April 2002

Abstract

The objective of this Paper is to propose a number of alternative decentralized interpretations of representative agent style stochastic growth economies and to explore their implications for the generality of this model construct. Under our first interpretation, firms exist forever and undertake all multi-period investment decisions while consumer-worker-investors only own financial claims to the firm's output. This contrasts with the more standard decentralization approach where firms exist on a period-by-period basis and consumer-worker-investors have direct title to the economy's capital stock. Under our second interpretation shareholders hire a manager who undertakes the firm's investment decisions in conformity with his incentive contract. The time series properties of the shareholder-manager economy are seen to replicate those of the analogous representative agent economy if and only if the manager's contract assumes a specific form. This suggests the time series properties of an economy where incentive contracts such as stock option plans are pervasive will differ from those of more standard real business cycle models.

Keywords: Stochastic growth model, business cycles, delegated management

JEL Classification: E32, E44

Suggested Citation

Danthine, Jean-Pierre and Donaldson, John B., Decentralizing the Stochastic Growth Model (April 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=315045

Jean-Pierre Danthine (Contact Author)

University of Lausanne - Institute of Banking and Finance (IBF) ( email )

Lausanne, 1015
Switzerland
+41 21 692 3485 (Phone)
+41 21 692 3335 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.hec.unil.ch/jdanthine/

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Swiss Finance Institute ( email )

c/o University of Geneve
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
1211 Geneva, CH-6900
Switzerland

John B. Donaldson

Columbia Business School - Finance and Economics ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

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