Dynamic Persuasion With Outside Information

43 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2018 Last revised: 5 May 2018

See all articles by Jacopo Bizzotto

Jacopo Bizzotto

Oslo Business School - OsloMet

Jesper Rüdiger

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Business Administration

Adrien Vigier

University of Oxford - Department of Economics

Date Written: April 26, 2018

Abstract

We examine the dynamic interaction between an agent and a principal aiming to persuade the former to approve a proposal of uncertain value. We allow for inside as well as outside information. The former is generated by the principal, who in turn exerts no control over the latter. Pareto efficiency requires the agent never to wait for outside information. We fully characterize the conditions in which equilibrium outcomes are efficient and discuss two leading applications: drug reviews and scholarly peer review.

Keywords: Dynamic Information Provision, Bayesian Persuasion, Drug Approval, Scholarly Peer Review

JEL Classification: C72, C73, D83

Suggested Citation

Bizzotto, Jacopo and Rüdiger, Jesper and Vigier, Adrien, Dynamic Persuasion With Outside Information (April 26, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3154313 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3154313

Jacopo Bizzotto (Contact Author)

Oslo Business School - OsloMet ( email )

Pilestredet 35
Oslo, 0166
Norway

Jesper Rüdiger

Universidad Carlos III de Madrid - Department of Business Administration ( email )

Calle Madrid 126
Getafe, Madrid, Madrid 28903
Spain

Adrien Vigier

University of Oxford - Department of Economics ( email )

Manor Road Building
Manor Road
Oxford, OX1 3BJ
United Kingdom

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