Labour Taxation and Employment in Trade Union Models: A Partial Survey

Bank of Finland Discussion Papers 19/2001

32 Pages Posted: 17 Jun 2002

See all articles by Erkki Koskela

Erkki Koskela

University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Bank of Finland - Research Department; IZA Institute of Labor Economics

Date Written: September 21, 2001

Abstract

This paper uses a union bargaining framework, where the wage rate is negotiated between the representatives of employees and employers and firms unilaterally determine employment, to discuss the relationship between labour taxation and employment. In imperfectly competitive labour markets higher labour taxes - income and payroll taxes - will increase labour costs and have negative effects on employment. Tax progression tends to moderate wages and boost employment. Moreover, if labour tax bases are unequal due to tax exemptions, the structure of labour taxation matters so that the tax wedge may not be a sufficient statistic to describe the channel of influence of labour taxation. Finally, distortionary effects of labour taxes in more corporatist economies should be smaller than in economies with more decentralised wage bargaining. Empirical evidence - though not always very strong - supports these notions.

Keywords: union bargaining, labour taxation, tax progression

JEL Classification: J51, H20, H22

Suggested Citation

Koskela, Erkki, Labour Taxation and Employment in Trade Union Models: A Partial Survey (September 21, 2001). Bank of Finland Discussion Papers 19/2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=315485 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.315485

Erkki Koskela (Contact Author)

University of Helsinki - Department of Political and Economic Studies ( email )

P.O. Box 54
FIN-00014 Helsinki
Finland
+358 9 191 8894 (Phone)
+358 9 191 8877 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.cesifo.de/servlet/page?_pageid=56&_dad=portal30&_schema=PORTAL30&pa_id=7298

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de

Bank of Finland - Research Department ( email )

P.O. Box 160
FIN-00101 Helsinki
Finland

IZA Institute of Labor Economics

P.O. Box 7240
Bonn, D-53072
Germany

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