Transparency is the New Opacity: Constructing Financial Regulation After the Crisis

Abstract

Many of the main actors constructing financial regulation in the wake of the global financial crisis era have a stated commitment to transparency. However, transparency in financial regulation is undermined because the information disclosed is simultaneously limited and excessive. On one hand, the communications are limited: transnational standard-setters publish their documents in a small number of languages (or only in English). Some institutions publish the full text of responses to consultations whereas others collate and condense responses (sometimes in ways that the responders regard as inaccurate). The characteristics of the bodies which respond to consultations, and their relationships with those whose interests they claim to represent may be visible or hidden. On the other hand, the communications are overwhelming. Even partial transparency is of limited usefulness to observers of financial regulation because it is characterized by multiple complexities: financial transactions and the rules which apply to them are complex. Responsibility for financial regulation is shared among public and private bodies, and among transnational, national and sub-national entities. As a result, proposals for new rules and standards multiply among these different entities, creating an information glut. The inadequacy of transparency mechanisms can be remedied, for example, by translating proposals into more languages or by providing and requiring improved disclosure of responses and responders. But the opacity which results from complexity is much more difficult to remedy and more fundamental. If this problem cannot be solved, transparency alone cannot be relied on to legitimate the new financial order.

Keywords: transparency, financial regulation, financial crisis, financial transaction