The Effects of Pre-Play Communication in a Coordination Game with Incomplete Information

31 Pages Posted: 24 Apr 2018

See all articles by Youxin Hu

Youxin Hu

Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE) - Research Institute of Economics & Management

John H. Kagel

Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics

Huanxing Yang

Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics

Lan Zhang

Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE)

Date Written: April 2, 2018

Abstract

The effects of pre-play communication in a coordination game with incomplete information about players’ intensity of preferences are compared to no communication controls. Pre-play communication significantly increases subjects’ payoffs and the probability of coordination, while reducing miscoordination. This results from communication being largely informative, in conjunction with the key prediction of the theory that when two players send different messages, they coordinate on the preferred action of the agent sending the higher message. As predicted, communication becomes more informative as the cost of miscoordination increases.

Keywords: Coordination game, Private information, Pre-play communication, Experiment

JEL Classification: D23, D74, D82

Suggested Citation

Hu, Youxin and Kagel, John H. and Yang, Huanxing and Zhang, Lan, The Effects of Pre-Play Communication in a Coordination Game with Incomplete Information (April 2, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3156442 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3156442

Youxin Hu (Contact Author)

Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE) - Research Institute of Economics & Management ( email )

55 Guanghuacun Street
Chengdu, Sichuan 610074
China

John H. Kagel

Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics ( email )

1945 North High Street
Columbus, OH 43210-1172
United States

Huanxing Yang

Ohio State University (OSU) - Economics ( email )

410 Arps Hall
1945 N. High St.
Columbus, OH 43210-1172
United States

Lan Zhang

Southwestern University of Finance and Economics (SWUFE) ( email )

55 Guanghuacun St,
Chengdu, Sichuan 610074
China

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
34
Abstract Views
196
PlumX Metrics