Populism, Financial Inequality and Central Bank Independence: A Political Economics Approach

23 Pages Posted: 5 Apr 2018 Last revised: 3 Aug 2018

See all articles by Donato Masciandaro

Donato Masciandaro

Bocconi University - Department of Economics

Francesco Passarelli

Bocconi University

Date Written: April 1, 2018

Abstract

This paper examines myopic, populist policies that guarantee short-term financial protection of the people from the elite without regard for long-term fiscal or monetary distortions. Assuming that citizens are financially heterogeneous, this paper shows that inefficient outcomes can arise when the majority of citizens are bank stakeholders. Populist policies promote politically controlled central banks.

Keywords: Populism, central bank independence, monetary policy, banking policy, political economy

JEL Classification: D72, D78, E31, E52, E58, E62

Suggested Citation

Masciandaro, Donato and Passarelli, Francesco, Populism, Financial Inequality and Central Bank Independence: A Political Economics Approach (April 1, 2018). BAFFI CAREFIN Centre Research Paper No. 2018-74, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3156849 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3156849

Donato Masciandaro (Contact Author)

Bocconi University - Department of Economics ( email )

Via Gobbi 5
Milan, 20136
Italy

Francesco Passarelli

Bocconi University ( email )

Via Sarfatti, 25
Milan, MI 20136
Italy

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
130
Abstract Views
768
rank
267,246
PlumX Metrics