The Role of Visibility on Third Party Punishment Actions for the Enforcement of Social Norms

29 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2018 Last revised: 17 Jun 2018

See all articles by Kenju Kamei

Kenju Kamei

Durham University - Department of Economics and Finance

Date Written: June 6, 2018

Abstract

This paper presents results from a prisoner’s dilemma game experiment with a third party punisher. Third party punishment was frequently observed, in line with previous studies. Despite the prevalence of punishment, having one third party punisher in a group did not make one’s defection materially unbeneficial because of the weak punishment intensity observed. When a third party player’s action choice was made known to another third party player in a different group, however, third party punishment was sufficiently strong to transform the dilemma’s incentive structure into a coordination game, through which cooperation norms can be effectively enforced.

Keywords: experiment, dilemma, third party punishment, social norms

JEL Classification: C92, D01, H49

Suggested Citation

Kamei, Kenju, The Role of Visibility on Third Party Punishment Actions for the Enforcement of Social Norms (June 6, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3158664 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3158664

Kenju Kamei (Contact Author)

Durham University - Department of Economics and Finance ( email )

Durham, DH1 3HY
United Kingdom

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