Electoral Cycles in Macroprudential Regulation

65 Pages Posted: 22 Apr 2018 Last revised: 8 Sep 2020

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: September 7, 2020

Abstract

Do politics matter for macroprudential policies? I show that changes in macroprudential regulation exhibit a predictable electoral cycle in the run-up to 221 elections across 58 countries from 2000 through 2014. Policies restricting mortgages and consumer credit are systematically looser before elections, particularly during expansions in credit and house prices. Consistent with theories of opportunistic political cycles, this pattern is stronger when election outcomes are uncertain, regulators are closely tied to politicians, and institutions are poor. These results suggest that political pressures may limit the ability of regulators to "lean against the wind."

Keywords: Macroprudential Regulation, Electoral Cycle, Regulatory Cycle, Political Economy, Central Bank Independence

JEL Classification: G18, G21, G28, D72, D73, P16

Suggested Citation

Müller, Karsten, Electoral Cycles in Macroprudential Regulation (September 7, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3159086 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3159086

Karsten Müller (Contact Author)

Princeton University

Julis Romo Rabinowitz Building
Washington Road
Princeton, NJ 08544
United States

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
336
Abstract Views
2,236
rank
103,656
PlumX Metrics