Election Fraud and Political Survival of Subnational Actors: A Case of Russia

44 Pages Posted: 29 Apr 2018

See all articles by Kirill Kalinin

Kirill Kalinin

Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace

Date Written: April 10, 2018

Abstract

The political survival of governors in Russia largely depends on their ability to address the Kremlin's electoral needs during the federal elections. To ensure their own political survival and address Kremlin's electoral needs, the governors can resort to election fraud in both parliamentary and presidential elections. This research aims to study the degree to which election fraud helps governors to extend their terms in office by analyzing three major periods: 2000-2005 electoral period, when the governors were elected by their regional electorate; 2005-2012 appointment period, when the governors were appointed by the Kremlin; 2012-present post-appointment electoral period, when the gubernatorial elections were restored. In this paper I develop the theory of gubernatorial survival in Russia, formulate research hypotheses and test said hypotheses using a Cox proportional hazards model, which includes finite mixture estimates and last digits in percentages tests as primary measures of election fraud.

Keywords: Election fraud, political survival, governors, Russian elections

Suggested Citation

Kalinin, Kirill, Election Fraud and Political Survival of Subnational Actors: A Case of Russia (April 10, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3160355 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3160355

Kirill Kalinin (Contact Author)

Stanford University - The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution and Peace ( email )

Stanford, CA 94305-6010
United States

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