Effort, Inequality and Cooperation: Evidence from the Lab

SERIES Working Papers N. 02/2018

23 Pages Posted: 3 May 2018

See all articles by Kjetil Bjorvatn

Kjetil Bjorvatn

Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Nicola D. Coniglio

Università degli Studi di Bari “Aldo Moro” (UNIBA) - Department of Economics and Mathematical Methods

Date Written: April 2018

Abstract

We investigate the impact of inequality on cooperation using a linear public good game and focusing on heterogeneity in the source of income, where some participants work for their endowment (“workers”) while others do not (“non-workers”). The key finding of our paper is that cooperation is higher when workers are grouped with other workers, and we provide evidence that the underlying mechanism for this result is a higher degree of altruism between workers. Our results thus lend support to the concerns that inequality may have detrimental effects on economic efficiency.

Keywords: public goods, inequality, source of income heterogeneity

JEL Classification: C92, H41, D63

Suggested Citation

Bjorvatn, Kjetil and Coniglio, Nicola D., Effort, Inequality and Cooperation: Evidence from the Lab (April 2018). SERIES Working Papers N. 02/2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3163779 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3163779

Kjetil Bjorvatn

Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Helleveien 30
N-5035 Bergen
Norway
47-55 9595 85 (Phone)
47-55 9595 43 (Fax)

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

Nicola D. Coniglio (Contact Author)

Università degli Studi di Bari “Aldo Moro” (UNIBA) - Department of Economics and Mathematical Methods ( email )

Largo Abbey St. Scholastica
Bari, 70124
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.dse.uniba.it/Corsi/docenti/Coniglio/Nicola_paginaWeb.htm

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