Can Latent Groups Influence Policy Decisions? The Case of Telecommunications Policy

48 Pages Posted: 18 Jul 2002

Abstract

Electoral constituencies recognize favorable policy outcomes in high-turnout jurisdictions (Key 1984 [1949]; Hamilton 1993; Fleck 1999). In the present paper, I evaluate whether underlying institutions might provide a finer explanation of this relationship. To do so, I formally examine variation in telecommunications policy across US states. The resulting evidence is consistent with residential customers recognizing more favorable policy when institutions reduce voting's resource cost (measured by registration rules) or increase its non-pecuniary benefit (measured by Perot-support). Measures of either force explain significantly more variation in the present data than does a measure of actual participation (i.e., turnout).

Keywords: collective action, electoral institutions

JEL Classification: D78, K23, L50

Suggested Citation

Falaschetti, Dino, Can Latent Groups Influence Policy Decisions? The Case of Telecommunications Policy. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=316421 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.316421

Dino Falaschetti (Contact Author)

U.S. House of Representatives ( email )

Committee on Financial Services
2129 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC District of Columbia 20515
United States

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