Competition Law Issues in the Human Resources Field

Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Volume 4, Issue 3, 1 June 2013, Pages 201–214 doi: 10.1093/jeclap/lpt017

34 Pages Posted: 4 May 2018 Last revised: 19 Apr 2021

See all articles by Gonenc Gurkaynak

Gonenc Gurkaynak

ELIG Gürkaynak Attorneys-at-Law

Ayse Guner Donmez

University of California Los Angeles

Ceren Özkanlı

ELIG Gürkaynak Attorneys-At-Law

Date Written: April 16, 2013

Abstract

Competitor agreement not to solicit or hire each other's employees as well as agreements among competitors to poach a rival entity's key employees could be deemed as a violation of competition law principles (and in some jurisdictions, public policy doctrines).

European and US jurisprudence shows that an agreement or merely the exchange of information concerning human resources data, such as wage/salary, among competitors could run afoul of competition law rules.

As an area of competition law, these more settled forms of anti-competitive risk-bearing practices deserve meticulous and sustained attention from practitioners in the field.

Keywords: human resources, antitrust, competition, collusive poaching agreements, wage-fixing agreements

JEL Classification: K21, L40, L44

Suggested Citation

Gurkaynak, Gonenc and Güner Dönmez, Ayşe and Özkanlı, Ceren, Competition Law Issues in the Human Resources Field (April 16, 2013). Journal of European Competition Law & Practice, Volume 4, Issue 3, 1 June 2013, Pages 201–214 doi: 10.1093/jeclap/lpt017 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3164251

Gonenc Gurkaynak (Contact Author)

ELIG Gürkaynak Attorneys-at-Law ( email )

Çitlenbik Sokak No:12
Yıldız Mahallesi
Istanbul, Beşiktaş 34349
Turkey

Ayşe Güner Dönmez

University of California Los Angeles ( email )

10920 Wilshire Blvd
Los Angeles, CA 90024
United States

Ceren Özkanlı

ELIG Gürkaynak Attorneys-At-Law ( email )

Yıldız Mah. Çitlenbik Sk. No:12
İstanbul, 34349
Turkey

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