A Model of Corruption in an Investment Project

Journal of Quantitative Economics, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 161-170, January 2001

12 Pages Posted: 26 Jul 2002

See all articles by Soumyen Sikdar

Soumyen Sikdar

University of Calcutta - Department of Economics

Sarbajit Chaudhuri

University of Calcutta

Abstract

The present paper analyzes the phenomenon of corruption in the context of a Public Works Department (PWD) in a developing country city and examines its tenacity in the face of anticorruption measures. Different behaviour patterns of the supervisor (official) of the PWD have been considered. The interesting result to emerge is that corruption may show a high degree of robustness against marginal attacks and such measures may actually be counterproductive in the different cases considered in this paper.

Keywords: Corruption, investment project, supervisor, contractor, bribe, anticorruption measures

Keywords: Corruption, investment project, supervisor, contractor, bribe, anticorruption measures

JEL Classification: C71, D72, H54

Suggested Citation

Sikdar, Soumyen and Chaudhuri, Sarbajit, A Model of Corruption in an Investment Project. Journal of Quantitative Economics, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 161-170, January 2001. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=316439

Soumyen Sikdar

University of Calcutta - Department of Economics ( email )

56A, B.T. Road
Kolkata, 700050
India
091-033-557-5082 (Phone)

Sarbajit Chaudhuri (Contact Author)

University of Calcutta ( email )

56A, B.T. Road
Kolkata, West Bengal 700 050
India
+91 33 2557 5082 (Phone)
+91 33 2844 1490 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://econpapers.repec.org/RAS/pch11.htm

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