Auer Deference: Doubling Down on Delegation's Defects

68 Pages Posted: 18 Apr 2018

See all articles by Ronald A. Cass

Ronald A. Cass

Center for the Rule of Law; Cass & Associates, PC; Boston University School of Law; Center for the Study of the Administrative State at George Mason School of Law

Date Written: April 18, 2018

Abstract

Together with the better-known Chevron deference rule, the doctrine articulated in Auer v. Robbins two decades ago—which makes reasonable administrative constructions of ambiguous administrative rules binding on courts in most circumstances—has become a focal point for concerns about the expanding administrative state. Auer deference, even more than Chevron deference, enlarges administrative authority in ways at odds with basic constitutional structures and due process requirements. Objections to Auer have given cogent reasons why courts should not grant deference to administrative interpretations merely because an agency’s rule is unclear. The most commonly voiced objections, however, do not explain why Congress should be disabled in all instances from granting administrators discretionary authority over rule-interpretation—even in settings not raising serious risk of partiality or unfair surprise in administrative construction.

Examining the relationship between statutorily-directed deference and constitutional-structural principles clarifies the essential underlying objection to Auer and the limits of that objection. When Congress by law confers discretionary authority that does not exceed its constitutional power to delegate functions to an administrator, courts should respect that assignment of authority unless it violates other specific constitutional commands.

Yet, when delegations are at most only arguably consistent with the Constitution, extending deference—especially expanding deference as Auer does in successive determinations—exacerbates delegations’ difficulties.

A reinvigorated non-delegation doctrine would solve the major Auer problem directly, and elimination of Auer-like deference would be clearly preferable to retaining the doctrine in its current form. Short of that, demanding that the statutory basis for deference is clearly articulated—that Congress plainly convey authority for administrators to exercise discretion at the second level of administrative rule implementation as well as the first level of more direct statutory implementation—would provide a modest first step in cabining problems associated with constitutionally questionable delegations of law-making authority. Those who embrace the rule of law, whether advocates or opponents of the modern administrative state, should support that step.

Keywords: Chevron deference, administrative law, Auer, rule-making, administrative rules, regulation, delegation, Congress, administrative state, Seminole Rock, Robertson

JEL Classification: K10, K23

Suggested Citation

Cass, Ronald A., Auer Deference: Doubling Down on Delegation's Defects (April 18, 2018). Fordham Law Review, Vol. 87; George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 18-06. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3164975

Ronald A. Cass (Contact Author)

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