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Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing

Posted: 15 Aug 2002  

Frank H. Page Jr.

Indiana University, Bloomington - Department of Economics; Systemic Risk Centre, LSE

Paulo Klinger Monteiro Sr.

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - EPGE

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Abstract

We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a competitive analog to the revelation principle which we call the implementation principle. This principle provides a complete characterization of all incentive compatible, indirect contracting mechanisms in terms of contract catalogs (or menus), and allows us to conclude that in competitive contracting situations, firms in choosing their contracting strategies can restrict attention, without loss of generality, to contract catalogs. Second, we establish a competitive taxation principle. This principle, a refinement of the implementation principle, provides a complete characterization of all implementable nonlinear pricing schedules in terms of product-price catalogs and allows us to reduce any game played over nonlinear pricing schedules to a strategically equivalent game played over product-price catalogs. Third, using the competitive taxation principle and a recent result due to Reny (1999) on the existence of Nash equilibria in discontinuous games, we demonstrate the existence of a Nash equilibrium for the mixed extension of the nonlinear pricing game.

Keywords: competitive nonlinear pricing, delegation principle, implementation principle, competitive taxation principle, revelation principle, Nash equilibria for discontinuous games

JEL Classification: D82, L51

Suggested Citation

Page, Frank H. and Monteiro, Paulo Klinger, Three Principles of Competitive Nonlinear Pricing. Journal of Mathematical Economics, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=316561

Frank H. Page Jr. (Contact Author)

Indiana University, Bloomington - Department of Economics ( email )

Wylie Hall
Bloomington, IN 47405-6620
United States

Systemic Risk Centre, LSE ( email )

Houghton St
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

HOME PAGE: http://www.systemicrisk.ac.uk/

Paulo Klinger Monteiro Sr.

Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) - EPGE ( email )

sala 1103
Rio de Janeiro RJ, 22250-900
Brazil
+55 21 37995838 (Phone)
+55 21 25538821 (Fax)

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