Export Cartels and the Case for Global Welfare

Global Antitrust Review 2017

27 Pages Posted: 8 May 2018

Date Written: 2017

Abstract

Export cartels are generally exempted from domestic competition laws. The status quo causes inefficiencies and unnecessary friction in various markets around the world. As such, their treatment represents a gap in international antitrust. Despite several attempts, multilaterally agreed restrictions on export cartels elude the international community for a number of reasons, such as market access demands and protecting 'national champions'. This essay examines trade friction occurring in the form of export cartels: what are they, are they problematic, and whom do they affect most? It explores the challenges that have prevented deeper international cooperation to address export cartels by building on prior legal discourse, in order to identify those issues on which a resolution hinges. The essay concludes by proposing both substantive resolutions as well as appropriate facilitators for negotiations and enforcers of a resolution.

Keywords: export cartel, competition law

Suggested Citation

Ristaniemi, Michael, Export Cartels and the Case for Global Welfare (2017). Global Antitrust Review 2017, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3166228

Michael Ristaniemi (Contact Author)

Vrije Universiteit Brussel (VUB) ( email )

Pleinlaan 2
http://www.vub.ac.be/
Brussels, 1050
Belgium

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