Information in Mandatory and Voluntary Earnings Announcement Date Forecasts

60 Pages Posted: 23 Apr 2018

See all articles by Mary E. Barth

Mary E. Barth

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

Greg Clinch

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Business School

Paul Ma

University of Minnesota

Date Written: April 22, 2018

Abstract

We address whether mandatory forecasts of earnings announcement dates are informative and what are the informational tradeoffs between mandatory and voluntary forecasts. We find China mandatory forecasts predict actual earnings announcement dates and yet-to-be-announced firm performance, and the market reacts to the initial and revised forecasts accordingly. Regarding informational tradeoffs we find the following. China mandatory forecasts are informative, even by firms less likely to issue a voluntary forecast; this information is unavailable in a voluntary regime. The act of US voluntary forecasting and its timing reveal information incremental to the forecasted announcement date, which is unavailable in a mandatory regime. Perhaps surprisingly, US voluntary and China mandatory initial forecasts convey a similar amount of earnings news, which is noteworthy because the China forecasts are issued substantially earlier and suggests the amount of information in the act and timing of voluntary forecasts is small.

Keywords: forecasts of earnings announcement dates, mandatory forecasting, private information precision, voluntary disclosure, informational tradeoffs, information timeliness

JEL Classification: D84, G14, M48

Suggested Citation

Barth, Mary E. and Clinch, Greg and Ma, Paul, Information in Mandatory and Voluntary Earnings Announcement Date Forecasts (April 22, 2018). Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 18-20. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3166906 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3166906

Mary E. Barth

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-9040 (Phone)
650-725-0468 (Fax)

Greg Clinch

University of Melbourne - Melbourne Business School ( email )

200 Leicester Street
Carlton, Victoria 3053 3186
Australia
61-03-834-45-475 (Phone)
61-03-934-92-397 (Fax)

Paul Ma (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota ( email )

19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.paulma.org

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