Information in Mandatory and Voluntary Earnings Announcement Date Forecasts

58 Pages Posted: 23 Apr 2018 Last revised: 15 Jul 2019

See all articles by Mary E. Barth

Mary E. Barth

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business

Greg Clinch

Independent

Paul Ma

University of Minnesota

Date Written: July 13, 2019

Abstract

We address whether mandatory forecasts of earnings announcement dates are informative and what are the informational tradeoffs between mandatory and voluntary forecasts. We find mandatory forecasts in China predict actual earnings announcement dates and yet-to-be-announced firm performance, and the market reacts to the initial and revised forecasts accordingly. Regarding informational tradeoffs we find the following. The mandatory forecasts are informative, even by firms less likely to issue a voluntary forecast. This information is unavailable in a voluntary regime. The act of US voluntary forecasting and its timing each reveals information incremental to the forecasted announcement date, both of which are unavailable in a mandatory regime. Perhaps surprisingly, US voluntary and China mandatory forecasts convey a similar amount of earnings news, which is noteworthy because the China forecasts are considerably more timely, and this finding suggests the amount of information in the act and timing of voluntary forecasts is small.

Keywords: forecasts of earnings announcement dates, mandatory forecasting, private information precision, voluntary disclosure, informational tradeoffs

JEL Classification: D84, G14, M48

Suggested Citation

Barth, Mary E. and Clinch, Greg and Ma, Paul, Information in Mandatory and Voluntary Earnings Announcement Date Forecasts (July 13, 2019). Stanford University Graduate School of Business Research Paper No. 18-20. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3166906 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3166906

Mary E. Barth

Stanford University - Graduate School of Business ( email )

655 Knight Way
Stanford, CA 94305-5015
United States
650-723-9040 (Phone)
650-725-0468 (Fax)

Greg Clinch

Independent

No Address Available

Paul Ma (Contact Author)

University of Minnesota ( email )

19th Avenue South
Minneapolis, MN 55455
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.paulma.org

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