Trade Versus Direct Investment: Modal Neutrality and National Treatment

14 Pages Posted: 25 Jun 2002

See all articles by Bernard Hoekman

Bernard Hoekman

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies; European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Kamal Saggi

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 2002

Abstract

International agreements increasingly constrain the ability of governments to use trade policies whereas few constraints apply to the use of investment policies. Using a model in which a local and a foreign firm compete in the domestic market, we analyse whether the foreign firm may be forced to adopt an inefficient mode of supply (exports versus FDI) when the domestic government is constrained in its ability to use trade policy, but is free to set its FDI policy. We find that the foreign firm chooses the efficient mode of supply, even under a discriminatory output tax levied on FDI. This result suggests that the case for multilateral investment rules on efficiency grounds needs careful evaluation.

Keywords: Foreign direct investment, trade policy, national treatment, modes of supply, neutrality, oligopoly

JEL Classification: F12, F23

Suggested Citation

Hoekman, Bernard and Hoekman, Bernard and Saggi, Kamal, Trade Versus Direct Investment: Modal Neutrality and National Treatment (May 2002). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=316701

Bernard Hoekman (Contact Author)

Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies ( email )

Fiesole, Tuscany
Italy

European University Institute - Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS) ( email )

Villa La Fonte, via delle Fontanelle 18
50016 San Domenico di Fiesole
Florence, Florence 50014
Italy

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Kamal Saggi

Southern Methodist University (SMU) - Department of Economics ( email )

Dallas, TX 75275
United States
214-768-3274 (Phone)
214-768-1821 (Fax)

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