Does Tenure Matter: Role of the Corporate Secretary in Chinese Listed Firms

Accounting Horizons, Forthcoming

37 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2018 Last revised: 7 Nov 2019

See all articles by Chen Wang

Chen Wang

Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University (XJTLU) - International Business School Suzhou

Qing Ye

Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University (XJTLU)

Abhinav Goyal

University College Cork

Date Written: July 15, 2018

Abstract

We study the impact of corporate secretary tenure on the governance quality of Chinese A-share listed firms. Results show that corporate secretary tenure is negatively associated with board meeting frequency, outside director in-meeting dissent and incidence of fraud and lawsuit. Key findings are robust to an array of additional tests including the propensity score matching, instrument variable analysis as well as alternate governance measures such as analyst coverage, modified auditor opinion, number of institutional shareholders, and outside director board meeting absence. Overall, our study confirms the importance of corporate secretary in favour of modern corporate governance outcomes and board processes.

Keywords: corporate secretary, tenure, fraud, lawsuit, outside directors, corporate governance

JEL Classification: G15, G30, K22, M41

Suggested Citation

Wang, Chen and Ye, Qing and Goyal, Abhinav, Does Tenure Matter: Role of the Corporate Secretary in Chinese Listed Firms (July 15, 2018). Accounting Horizons, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3167669

Chen Wang

Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University (XJTLU) - International Business School Suzhou ( email )

111 Ren'ai Road
Suzhou Industrial Park
Suzhou, Jiangsu 215123
China

Qing Ye (Contact Author)

Xi'an Jiaotong-Liverpool University (XJTLU) ( email )

111 Renai Road, SIP
Suzhou, JiangSu province 215123
China

Abhinav Goyal

University College Cork ( email )

O'Rahilly Building
College Road
Cork
Ireland
+353 (0)21 490 2839 (Phone)

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