Persuasion via Weak Institutions

63 Pages Posted: 10 May 2018 Last revised: 6 Dec 2019

See all articles by Elliot Lipnowski

Elliot Lipnowski

Columbia University

Doron Ravid

University of Chicago - Department of Economics

Denis Shishkin

Princeton University - Department of Economics

Date Written: December 5, 2019

Abstract

A sender commissions a study to persuade a receiver, but influences the report with some state-dependent probability. We show that increasing this probability can benefit the receiver and can lead to a discontinuous drop in the sender’s payoffs. We also examine a public-persuasion setting, where we show the sender especially prefers her report to be immune to influence in bad states. To derive our results, we geometrically characterize the sender’s highest equilibrium payoff, which is based on the concave envelope of her capped value function.

Keywords: persuasion, weak institutions, cheap talk, belief-based approach, information design

JEL Classification: D82, D83, D73, D02

Suggested Citation

Lipnowski, Elliot and Ravid, Doron and Shishkin, Denis, Persuasion via Weak Institutions (December 5, 2019). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3168103 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3168103

Elliot Lipnowski (Contact Author)

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Doron Ravid

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

1126 E. 59th St
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Denis Shishkin

Princeton University - Department of Economics ( email )

Julis Romo Rabonowitz Building
Department of Economics
Princeton, NJ 08544
United States

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