Download This PaperPersuasion via Weak Institutions
63 Pages Posted: 10 May 2018 Last revised: 27 Dec 2021
Date Written: December 23, 2021
Abstract
A sender commissions a study to persuade a receiver, but influences the report with some probability. We show that increasing this probability can benefit the receiver and can lead to a discontinuous drop in the sender’s payoffs. To derive our results, we geometrically characterize the sender’s highest equilibrium payoff, which is based on the concavification of a capped value function.
Keywords: persuasion, weak institutions, cheap talk, belief-based approach, information design
JEL Classification: D82, D83, D73, D02
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Lipnowski, Elliot and Ravid, Doron and Shishkin, Denis, Persuasion via Weak Institutions (December 23, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3168103 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3168103
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