Persuasion via Weak Institutions

95 Pages Posted: 10 May 2018 Last revised: 22 Jul 2021

See all articles by Elliot Lipnowski

Elliot Lipnowski

Columbia University

Doron Ravid

University of Chicago - Department of Economics

Denis Shishkin

University of California, San Diego (UCSD)

Date Written: July 20, 2021

Abstract

A sender commissions a study to persuade a receiver, but influences the report with some probability. We show that increasing this probability can benefit the receiver and can lead to a discontinuous drop in the sender’s payoffs. We also examine a public-persuasion setting, where we observe the report’s susceptibility to influence restricts the amount of information the sender can provide. To derive our results, we geometrically characterize the sender’s highest equilibrium payoff, which is based on the concave envelope of her capped value function.

Keywords: persuasion, weak institutions, cheap talk, belief-based approach, information design

JEL Classification: D82, D83, D73, D02

Suggested Citation

Lipnowski, Elliot and Ravid, Doron and Shishkin, Denis, Persuasion via Weak Institutions (July 20, 2021). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3168103 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3168103

Elliot Lipnowski (Contact Author)

Columbia University ( email )

3022 Broadway
New York, NY 10027
United States

Doron Ravid

University of Chicago - Department of Economics ( email )

1126 E. 59th St
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Denis Shishkin

University of California, San Diego (UCSD) ( email )

9500 Gilman Drive
Mail Code 0502
La Jolla, CA 92093-0112
United States

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