Rent-Extraction from the Unemployment Insurance System: The Role of Firms

62 Pages Posted: 30 Apr 2018 Last revised: 26 Aug 2020

See all articles by Bernardus Ferdinandus Nazar Van Doornik

Bernardus Ferdinandus Nazar Van Doornik

Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil - Central Bank of Brazil

David Schoenherr

Princeton University, Bendheim Center for Finance; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Janis Skrastins

Washington University in St. Louis

Date Written: August 25, 2020

Abstract

Exploiting an unemployment insurance (UI) reform in Brazil, we document formal layoff and recall patterns consistent with rent extraction from the UI system. Firms lay off workers just as they become eligible for UI benefits and recall them just when benefits cease. In addition, firms continue to employ some of the formally laid off workers informally. Salary patterns around the reform are consistent with workers sharing rents with firms through lower equilibrium salaries. We estimate that 2.3 to 11.8 percent of UI payments do not fulfill an insurance purpose, but redistribute income to firms and workers who play the system.

Keywords: unemployment insurance, informal labor markets, collusion, law and economics

JEL Classification: J21, J22, J46, J65, K31

Suggested Citation

Doornik, Bernardus Ferdinandus Nazar Van and Schoenherr, David and Skrastins, Janis, Rent-Extraction from the Unemployment Insurance System: The Role of Firms (August 25, 2020). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3168769 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3168769

Bernardus Ferdinandus Nazar Van Doornik

Government of the Federative Republic of Brazil - Central Bank of Brazil ( email )

P.O. Box 08670
SBS Quadra 3 Bloco B - Edificio-Sede
Brasilia, Distr. Federal 70074-900
Brazil

David Schoenherr (Contact Author)

Princeton University, Bendheim Center for Finance ( email )

26 Prospect Avenue
Princeton, NJ 08540
United States

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o the Royal Academies of Belgium
Rue Ducale 1 Hertogsstraat
1000 Brussels
Belgium

Janis Skrastins

Washington University in St. Louis ( email )

1 brookings drive
campus box 1133
st louis, MO St Louis 63130
United States

HOME PAGE: http://www.jskrastins.com

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