Examining Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Corporate Offending and Beyond‐Compliance Behavior: The Efficacy of Direct and Indirect Regulatory Interactions

24 Pages Posted: 26 Apr 2018

See all articles by Melissa Rorie

Melissa Rorie

University of Nevada, Las Vegas

Sally Simpson

University of Maryland - Department of Criminology & Criminal Justice

Mark A. Cohen

Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics; Vanderbilt University - Law School; Resources for the Future

Michael P. Vandenbergh

Vanderbilt University - Law School

Date Written: April 2018

Abstract

Tom Tyler's Procedural Justice Theory has received support in a variety of studies using criminal justice authorities as the research focus. To date, the theory has not been empirically tested using corporate malfeasance as an outcome, despite evidence that procedural justice is important in achieving regulatory compliance. This study uses factorial survey methods to examine whether corporate behavior is predicted by professionals' perceptions of procedural justice and legal legitimacy. We find that procedural justice and legitimacy considerations are salient only when managers have direct contact with regulatory authorities. This supports John Braithwaite's argument that effective regulation is enhanced by microlevel interactions in which procedural justice can be effectively leveraged to promote compliance.

Suggested Citation

Rorie, Melissa and Simpson, Sally and Cohen, Mark A. and Vandenbergh, Michael P., Examining Procedural Justice and Legitimacy in Corporate Offending and Beyond‐Compliance Behavior: The Efficacy of Direct and Indirect Regulatory Interactions (April 2018). Law & Policy, Vol. 40, Issue 2, pp. 172-195, 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3168898 or http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/lapo.12100

Melissa Rorie (Contact Author)

University of Nevada, Las Vegas ( email )

4505 S. Maryland Parkway
Las Vegas, NV 89154
United States

Sally Simpson

University of Maryland - Department of Criminology & Criminal Justice ( email )

2220 LeFrak Hall
College Park, MD 20742
United States

Mark A. Cohen

Vanderbilt University - Strategy and Business Economics ( email )

Nashville, TN 37203
United States
615-322-0533 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://https://business.vanderbilt.edu/bio/mark-cohen/

Vanderbilt University - Law School

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States

Resources for the Future ( email )

1616 P Street, NW
Washington, DC 20036
United States
202-328-5000 (Phone)

Michael P. Vandenbergh

Vanderbilt University - Law School ( email )

131 21st Avenue South
Nashville, TN 37203-1181
United States

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