Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion

Posted: 11 May 2018 Last revised: 3 Jan 2019

See all articles by Giuseppe Attanasi

Giuseppe Attanasi

Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion (GREDEG)

Claire Rimbaud

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE)

Marie Claire Villeval

GATE, CNRS

Multiple version iconThere are 3 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 26, 2018

Abstract

Donors usually need intermediaries to transfer their donations to recipients. A risk is that donations can be embezzled before they reach the recipients. Using psychological game theory, we design a novel three-player Embezzlement Mini-Game to study whether intermediaries suffer from guilt aversion and whether guilt aversion toward the recipient is stronger than toward the donor. Testing the predictions of the model in a laboratory experiment, we show that the proportion of guilt-averse intermediaries is the same irrespective of the direction of the guilt. However, structural estimates indicate that the effect of guilt on behaviour is higher when the guilt is directed toward the recipient.

Keywords: Embezzlement, Dishonesty, Guilt Aversion, Psychological Game Theory, Experiment

JEL Classification: C91

Suggested Citation

Attanasi, Giuseppe and Rimbaud, Claire and Villeval, Marie Claire, Embezzlement and Guilt Aversion (April 26, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3169219 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3169219

Giuseppe Attanasi (Contact Author)

Université de Nice Sophia Antipolis - Groupe de Recherche en Droit, Economie et Gestion (GREDEG) ( email )

250, rue Albert Einstein
Valbonne, 06560
France

Claire Rimbaud

University of Lyon 2 - Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE) ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France

Marie Claire Villeval

GATE, CNRS ( email )

93, chemin des Mouilles
Ecully, 69130
France
+33 472 86 60 79 (Phone)
+33 472 86 60 90 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://sites.google.com/view/marie-claire-villeval

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