Regulation Costs and Private-Sector Know-How Spillovers of Public-Private Partnerships

21 Pages Posted: 27 Apr 2018 Last revised: 4 Jun 2018

See all articles by Marian W. Moszoro

Marian W. Moszoro

Warsaw School of Economics (SGH); International Monetary Fund (IMF); George Mason University - Department of Economics; George Mason University - Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES)

Date Written: December 15, 2017

Abstract

The paper presents comparative statics of organizational modes of natural monopoly in public utilities with a focus on co-ownership and co-governance. Private monopoly lowers output and increases price to maximize profit; public monopoly incurs higher costs due to the lack of know-how; and a regulated monopoly results in regulation costs to overcome informational asymmetries. A public-private partnership arises as an efficient organization mode when it enables the internalization of private know-how and saves regulation costs due to correspondingly sufficient private and public residual and control rights. Public-private monopoly supports higher prices than marginal costs due to rent sharing, with its upper price frontier decreasing in private residual rights.

Keywords: fiscal policy, benefit-cost analysis, stabilization policy, cost of government

JEL Classification: L22, L32, L43, L51

Suggested Citation

Moszoro, Marian W., Regulation Costs and Private-Sector Know-How Spillovers of Public-Private Partnerships (December 15, 2017). GMU Working Paper in Economics No. 18-11, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3169571 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3169571

Marian W. Moszoro (Contact Author)

Warsaw School of Economics (SGH) ( email )

aleja Niepodleglosci 162
PL-Warsaw, 02-554
Poland

International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )

700 19th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20431
United States

George Mason University - Department of Economics ( email )

4400 University Drive
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

HOME PAGE: http://economics.gmu.edu/people/mmoszoro

George Mason University - Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science (ICES) ( email )

400P Truland Building
George Mason University
Fairfax, VA 22030
United States

Here is the Coronavirus
related research on SSRN

Paper statistics

Downloads
32
Abstract Views
384
PlumX Metrics