A Welfare Comparison of International Tax Regimes with Cross-Ownership of Firms

27 Pages Posted: 29 Sep 1997

See all articles by Harry Huizinga

Harry Huizinga

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Soren Bo Nielsen

Copenhagen Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Abstract

This paper considers a world of many symmetric countries where public goods in principle are financed by taxes on saving, investment and pure profits. In theory, countries could use all three taxes in combination. In practice, however, the tax instrument set may be restricted by, for instance, tax evasion of a particular kind or some international agreement. This paper compares welfare levels if countries set taxes noncooperatively across different tax instrument sets. We find that depending on the strength of preferences for public goods, tax evasion that renders either saving or investment taxes infeasible may be welfare improving, if firms are in part foreign-owned.

JEL Classification: H21, H26, H41

Suggested Citation

Huizinga, Harry and Nielsen, Soren Bo, A Welfare Comparison of International Tax Regimes with Cross-Ownership of Firms. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=31699 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.31699

Harry Huizinga (Contact Author)

Tilburg University - Center for Economic Research (CentER) ( email )

P.O. Box 90153
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
+31 13 466 2623 (Phone)
+31 13 466 3042 (Fax)

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Soren Bo Nielsen

Copenhagen Business School - Department of Economics ( email )

Porcelænshaven 16 A, 1
Frederiksberg C, DK-2000
Denmark

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany

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