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Dividend Policy Inside the Multinational Firm

32 Pages Posted: 24 Jun 2002  

Mihir A. Desai

Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

C. Fritz Foley

Harvard Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

James R. Hines Jr.

University of Michigan; NBER

Date Written: March 2003

Abstract

This paper analyzes dividend remittances by a large panel of foreign affiliates of U.S. multinational firms. The dividend policies of foreign affiliates, which convey no signals to public capital markets, nevertheless resemble those used by publicly held companies in paying dividends to diffuse common shareholders. Robustness checks verify that dividend policies of foreign affiliates are little affected by the dividend policies of their parent companies or parent company exposure to public capital markets. Systematic differences in the payout behavior of affiliates that differ in organizational form, and those that face differing tax costs of paying dividends, reveal the importance of tax factors; nevertheless, dividend policies are not solely determined by tax considerations. The absence of capital market considerations and the incompleteness of tax explanations together suggest that dividend policies are largely driven by the need to control managers of foreign affiliates. Parent firms are more willing to incur tax penalties by simultaneously investing funds while receiving dividends and to regularize dividend payments when their foreign affiliates are partially owned, located far from the United States, or in jurisdictions with inefficient judicial systems, all of which are implied by control theories of dividends.

JEL Classification: F23, G31, G35, H25, H87

Suggested Citation

Desai, Mihir A. and Foley, C. Fritz and Hines Jr., James R., Dividend Policy Inside the Multinational Firm (March 2003). EFA 2002 Berlin Meetings Presented Paper. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=317040 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.317040

Mihir A. Desai (Contact Author)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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Harvard Business School - Finance Unit ( email )

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617-496-6592 (Fax)

C. Fritz Foley

Harvard Business School ( email )

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Morgan 270C
Boston, MA 02163
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617-495-6375 (Phone)

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

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James Rodger Hines

University of Michigan ( email )

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Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States

NBER

1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

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