Time vs. State in Insurance: Experimental Evidence from Contract Farming in Kenya

66 Pages Posted: 1 May 2018

See all articles by Lorenzo Casaburi

Lorenzo Casaburi

University of Zurich; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: April 2018

Abstract

The gains from insurance arise from the transfer of income across states. Yet, by requiring that the premium be paid upfront, standard insurance products also transfer income across time. We show that this intertemporal transfer can help explain low insurance demand, especially among the poor, and in a randomized control trial in Kenya we test a crop insurance product which removes it. The product is interlinked with a contract farming scheme: as with other inputs, the buyer of the crop offers the insurance and deducts the premium from farmer revenues at harvest time. The take-up rate for pay-at-harvest insurance is 72%, compared to 5% for the standard pay-upfront contract, and the difference is largest among poorer farmers. Additional experiments and outcomes provide evidence on the role of liquidity constraints, present bias, and counterparty risk, and find that enabling farmers to commit to pay the premium just one month later increases demand by 21 percentage points.

Suggested Citation

Casaburi, Lorenzo, Time vs. State in Insurance: Experimental Evidence from Contract Farming in Kenya (April 2018). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP12896, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3171164

Lorenzo Casaburi (Contact Author)

University of Zurich ( email )

Rämistrasse 71
Zürich, CH-8006
Switzerland

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
0
Abstract Views
143
PlumX Metrics