Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms that Go Public?

53 Pages Posted: 7 May 2018 Last revised: 25 Sep 2018

See all articles by Brian J. Broughman

Brian J. Broughman

Indiana University Maurer School of Law

Jesse M. Fried

Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Date Written: September 4, 2018

Abstract

Black & Gilson (1998) argued that an IPO-welcoming stock market stimulates venture deals by enabling VCs to give founders a valuable “call option on control”. We study 18,000 startups to investigate the value of this option. Among firms that IPO, 60% of founders are no longer CEO. With little voting power, only half of the others survive three years as CEO. At initial VC financing, the probability of getting real control of a public firm for three years is 0.4%. Our results shed light on control evolution in startups, and cast doubt on the plausibility of the call-option theory linking stock and VC markets.

Keywords: Startups, Founders, Venture Capital, VC, IPOs, Stock Markets, Innovation, Entrepreneurs, Venture Capitalists, Corporate Governance, CEO, Shareholders, NASDAQ

JEL Classification: G24, G30, G32, G34, G38, H25, K2, K22, M13

Suggested Citation

Broughman, Brian J. and Fried, Jesse M., Do Founders Control Start-Up Firms that Go Public? (September 4, 2018). European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) - Law Working Paper No. 405/2018; Harvard Public Law Working Paper No. 18-23. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3171237 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3171237

Brian J. Broughman

Indiana University Maurer School of Law ( email )

211 S. Indiana Avenue
Bloomington, IN 47405
United States

Jesse M. Fried (Contact Author)

Harvard Law School ( email )

1575 Massachusetts
Griswold Hall 506
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-384-8158 (Phone)

HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/directory/10289/Fried

European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )

c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium

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