What Do We Know About Algorithmic Tacit Collusion?

11 Pages Posted: 15 May 2018 Last revised: 18 Jun 2018

Ai Deng

Bates White Economic Consulting; Advanced Academic Programs, Johns Hopkins University

Date Written: June 12, 2018

Abstract

The past few years have seen many legal scholars and antitrust agencies expressing interest in and concerns with algorithmic collusion. In this paper, I survey and draw lessons from the literature on Artificial Intelligence and on the economics of algorithmic tacit collusion. I show that a good understanding of this literature is a crucial first step to better understand the antitrust risks of algorithmic pricing and devise antitrust policies to combat such risks.

Keywords: algorithmic pricing, algorithmic collusion, artificial intelligence, antitrust

Suggested Citation

Deng, Ai, What Do We Know About Algorithmic Tacit Collusion? (June 12, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3171315 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3171315

Ai Deng (Contact Author)

Bates White Economic Consulting ( email )

2001 K Street NW, North Building
Suite 500
Washington, DC DC 20006
United States

Advanced Academic Programs, Johns Hopkins University ( email )

1717 Massachusetts Ave NW
Washington, DC DC 20036
United States

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
225
rank
124,336
Abstract Views
622
PlumX