What Do We Know About Algorithmic Tacit Collusion?

Antitrust, Vol. 33, No. 1, Fall 2018

17 Pages Posted: 15 May 2018 Last revised: 16 Feb 2019

See all articles by Ai Deng

Ai Deng

NERA Economic Consulting; Johns Hopkins University

Date Written: September 16, 2018

Abstract

The past few years have seen many legal scholars and antitrust agencies expressing interest in and concerns with algorithmic collusion. In this paper, I survey and draw lessons from the literature on Artificial Intelligence and on the economics of algorithmic tacit collusion. I show that a good understanding of this literature is a crucial first step to better understand the antitrust risks of algorithmic pricing and devise antitrust policies to combat such risks.

Keywords: algorithmic pricing, algorithmic collusion, artificial intelligence, antitrust

Suggested Citation

Deng, Ai, What Do We Know About Algorithmic Tacit Collusion? (September 16, 2018). Antitrust, Vol. 33, No. 1, Fall 2018. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3171315 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3171315

Ai Deng (Contact Author)

NERA Economic Consulting ( email )

1255 23rd Street, NW, Suite 600
Washington, DC 20037
United States

Johns Hopkins University ( email )

1717 Massachusetts Ave NW
Washington, DC DC 20036
United States

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