Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay

Fabrizio Ferri and Robert F. Göx (2018), "Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay", Foundations and Trends® in Accounting: Vol. 12: No. 1, pp 1-103. DOI: 10.1561/1400000043 The final publication of this monograph is available from now publishers.

113 Pages Posted: 19 Nov 2018

See all articles by Fabrizio Ferri

Fabrizio Ferri

University of Miami - Miami Business School

Robert F. Göx

University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW); University of Zurich - Managerial Accounting; University of Zurich - Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology

Date Written: May 1, 2018

Abstract

This monograph explores the relation between corporate governance and executive compensation and evaluates the conditions under which shareholders can benefit from the right to interfere with the pay setting process by voting on the compensation proposed by the board of directors (Say on Pay). The first part of the monograph lays out the theoretical framework. The second part provides an overview of the origins and country-specific differences in Say on Pay regulation and a detailed summary and evaluation of the empirical literature on the subject.

Suggested Citation

Ferri, Fabrizio and Goex, Robert F., Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay (May 1, 2018). Fabrizio Ferri and Robert F. Göx (2018), "Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, and Say on Pay", Foundations and Trends® in Accounting: Vol. 12: No. 1, pp 1-103. DOI: 10.1561/1400000043 The final publication of this monograph is available from now publishers.. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3171385

Fabrizio Ferri

University of Miami - Miami Business School ( email )

Coral Gables, FL 33146-6531
United States

Robert F. Goex (Contact Author)

University of Zurich - Department of Business Administration (IBW) ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich, 8032
Switzerland

University of Zurich - Managerial Accounting ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
Zurich, CH-8032
Switzerland

University of Zurich - Faculty of Economics, Business Administration and Information Technology ( email )

Plattenstrasse 14
Zürich, 8032
Switzerland

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