Informative Social Interactions

39 Pages Posted: 14 May 2018 Last revised: 7 Sep 2022

See all articles by Luc Arrondel

Luc Arrondel

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Hector F. Calvo Pardo

University of Southampton - Economics Division

Chryssi Giannitsarou

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Michael Haliassos

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 31, 2022

Abstract

Household finances are confidential and discussions are limited to a subset of peers. We collect novel representative survey data to examine separately whether interactions with inner and outer social circles influence return perceptions, expectations, and exposure to a widely known financial instrument in a developed economy with multiple information sources. We find that a respondent’s connectedness, proxied by perceived prevalence of information or participation in the small financial circle, improves expectation accuracy indirectly, through boosting accuracy of perceived past returns; and influences stock participation and exposure not only by influencing expectations, but also directly.

Keywords: Household finance; social interactions; subjective expectations; peer effects; information networks; portfolio choice.

JEL Classification: G5; D12; D83; D84; G11

Suggested Citation

Arrondel, Luc and Calvo Pardo, Hector F. and Giannitsarou, Chryssi and Haliassos, Michael, Informative Social Interactions (August 31, 2022). Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3171564 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3171564

Luc Arrondel

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

Hector F. Calvo Pardo

University of Southampton - Economics Division ( email )

University Rd.
Southampton SO17 1BJ, Hampshire SO17 1LP
United Kingdom
+442380595051 (Phone)
+442380593858 (Fax)

Chryssi Giannitsarou

University of Cambridge - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Austin Robinson Building
Sidgwick Avenue
Cambridge, CB3 9DD
United Kingdom

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

London
United Kingdom

Michael Haliassos (Contact Author)

Goethe University Frankfurt - Faculty of Economics and Business Administration ( email )

Theodor-W.-Adorno-Platz 3
PF H32
Frankfurt am Main, D-60323
Germany

Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Paris
France

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