How innovating firms manage knowledge leakage: A natural experiment on the threat of worker departure

Abstract

Knowledge protection strategies are crucial to innovating firms facing the risk of knowledge leakage. We examine the threat of worker departure as a key mechanism through which firms choose between patents and secrecy. We exploit a 1998 California court decision that ruled out-of-state noncompetes were not enforceable in California, thereby creating a loophole limiting non-California firms in their enforcement of noncompetes against their workers. When facing a higher threat of worker departure, firms strategically increased patent filings, exchanging legal protection for public disclosure of the invention. These effects were magnified for large-sized firms and for those in complex and fast-growing industries. Further mechanism tests on the possession of trade secrets, inventor migration, saliency of the decision, and independent inventors support our theoretical account.

Keywords: innovation strategy, knowledge management, patents, worker mobility, out-of-state non-competes

JEL Classification: O32, J61, K31, G34