Interactive Information Design

35 Pages Posted: 2 May 2018

See all articles by Frederic Koessler

Frederic Koessler

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Marie Laclau

Paris School of Economics (PSE)

Tristan Tomala

HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences

Date Written: April 25, 2018

Abstract

We study the interaction between multiple information designers who try to influence the behavior of a set of agents. When the set of messages available to each designer is finite, such games always admit subgame perfect equilibria. When designers produce public information about independent pieces of information, every equilibrium of the direct game (in which the set of messages coincides with the set of states) is an equilibrium with larger (possibly infinite) message sets. The converse is true for a class of Markovian equilibria only. When designers produce information for their own corporation of agents, pure strategy equilibria exist and are characterized via an auxiliary normal form game. In an infinite-horizon multi-period extension of information design games, a feasible outcome which Pareto dominates a more informative equilibrium of the one-period game is supported by an equilibrium of the multi-period game.

Keywords: Bayesian persuasion , information design , sharing rules , splitting games , statistical experiments.

JEL Classification: C72, D82

Suggested Citation

Koessler, Frederic and Laclau, Marie and Tomala, Tristan, Interactive Information Design (April 25, 2018). HEC Paris Research Paper No. ECO/SCD-2018-1260. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3171992 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3171992

Frederic Koessler (Contact Author)

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

Marie Laclau

Paris School of Economics (PSE) ( email )

48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France

Tristan Tomala

HEC Paris - Economics & Decision Sciences ( email )

1 rue de la Liberation
Paris, 78351
France

Register to save articles to
your library

Register

Paper statistics

Downloads
63
rank
340,583
Abstract Views
591
PlumX Metrics