Democratic Institutions, Reciprocity, and Pro-Social Behavior

38 Pages Posted: 16 May 2018 Last revised: 2 Aug 2018

See all articles by Luca Braghieri

Luca Braghieri

Stanford University - Department of Economics

Date Written: July 23, 2018

Abstract

Recent experimental research suggests that people behave more cooperatively when the rules governing a strategic interaction (e.g. a public goods game) are modified democratically than when they are modified exogenously. In a related experiment, I show that people are less likely to unilaterally destroy surplus for personal gain when a provisional allocation is chosen democratically than when an identical provisional allocation is imposed exogenously. I also develop a theory of reciprocity that can rationalize the main findings of the endogenous institutions literature, including the ones from this experiment.

Keywords: democratic institutions, reciprocity, democracy premium

JEL Classification: C92, D71, D90

Suggested Citation

Braghieri, Luca, Democratic Institutions, Reciprocity, and Pro-Social Behavior (July 23, 2018). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3172282 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3172282

Luca Braghieri (Contact Author)

Stanford University - Department of Economics ( email )

Landau Economics Building
579 Serra Mall
Stanford, CA 94305-6072
United States

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