The End of Corporate Law

28 Pages Posted: 18 May 2018

See all articles by Dalia Tsuk Mitchell

Dalia Tsuk Mitchell

George Washington University Law School

Date Written: 2009

Abstract

This article examines how corporate law, specifically the rules applicable to the allocation of power among directors, executives, and shareholders, has become ineffective as a means of regulating corporate power. I argue that in the course of the twentieth century corporate law has been used first to legitimate corporate power and then to exempt those exercising it from liability. The article focuses on jurists’ responses to the growth of the publicly held corporation in the early twentieth century, their midcentury attempts to create corporate democracy, and their ultimate turn to markets as the means of regulating corporate power.

Keywords: Corporations, Corporate Law, Corporate Legal History, Power, Directors, Officers, Fiduciary Duties, Shareholders, Shareholder Proposal Rule, Shareholder Democracy, Economic Theory of the Firm, Adolf A. Berle, William O. Douglas, Delaware Courts, In re Disney Derivative Litigation, Blasius Industries

Suggested Citation

Tsuk Mitchell, Dalia, The End of Corporate Law (2009). The End of Corporate Law, in a symposium on 'Corporate Governance and Climate Change,' WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW, vol. 44: 703-729 (fall 2009) , GWU Law School Public Law Research Paper No. 2018-23, GWU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2018-23, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3173286

Dalia Tsuk Mitchell (Contact Author)

George Washington University Law School ( email )

2000 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20052
United States

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