Allocation Schemes and Efficiencies of China's Carbon and Sulfur Emissions

In: Energy, Environment and Transitional Green Growth in China, R. Pang et al. (eds.), Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018

28 Pages Posted: 18 May 2018

See all articles by Zhongqi Deng

Zhongqi Deng

School of Economics, Sichuan University

Ruizhi Pang

Nankai University - College of Economic and Social Development

Yu Fan

Independent

Date Written: May 4, 2018

Abstract

The Chinese central government has adopted a nationwide administrative allocation policy to reduce carbon and sulfur emissions. Using the ZSG-DEA (Zero-Sum Gain Data Envelopment Analysis) approach, this paper evaluates and compares the emission efficiencies of China’s provincial CO2 and SO2, and provides a reallocation scheme. The results show that the administrative allocation leads to an increasing gap of provincial emissions-reduction ability; provinces with higher efficiencies have difficulty achieving their administrative targets, whereas provinces with lower efficiencies can more easily achieve their targets. Additionally, the administrative allocation scheme ignores the difference in efficiencies, whereas the ZSG allocation scheme of this paper emphasizes the Pareto optimality of economic, environmental, and energy factors while comprehensively considering fairness and efficiency.

Keywords: emissions allocation; efficiency; zsg-dea; Pareto optimality

JEL Classification: C61; C67; Q52

Suggested Citation

Deng, Zhongqi and Pang, Ruizhi and Fan, Yu, Allocation Schemes and Efficiencies of China's Carbon and Sulfur Emissions (May 4, 2018). In: Energy, Environment and Transitional Green Growth in China, R. Pang et al. (eds.), Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2018, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3173596

Zhongqi Deng (Contact Author)

School of Economics, Sichuan University ( email )

Chengdu, Sichuan
China

Ruizhi Pang

Nankai University - College of Economic and Social Development

Tianjin, Tianjin 300071
China

Yu Fan

Independent

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