Promises in Group Decision Making

Labsi Working Papers, N. 51/2018

26 Pages Posted: 17 May 2018

See all articles by Valeria Faralla

Valeria Faralla

University of Siena

Guido Borà

University of Siena - Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory; CERM Foundation

Alessandro Innocenti

University of Siena - Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory; University of Siena - Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences

Marco Novarese

University of Piemonte Orientale - Centre for Cognitive Economics

Date Written: May 4, 2018

Abstract

We assess in the laboratory the impact of promises on group decision-making. The gift-exchange game provides the testing ground for our experiment. When played between groups, inter-group cooperation and reciprocity represent a condition for efficiency in overall decision making. We find that promises have a significant positive effect on aggregate profits. We interpret these findings as if promises act as a trigger of social conformity, according to which groups adopt socially more desirable behavior even without face-to-face communication or discussion.

Keywords: Group Decision, Promise, Gift-Exchange Game, Efficiency, Social Conformity

JEL Classification: D81, D83

Suggested Citation

Faralla, Valeria and Borà, Guido and Innocenti, Alessandro and Novarese, Marco, Promises in Group Decision Making (May 4, 2018). Labsi Working Papers, N. 51/2018 , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3173669

Valeria Faralla (Contact Author)

University of Siena ( email )

Via Banchi di Sotto, 55
Siena, 53100
Italy

Guido Borà

University of Siena - Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory ( email )

Piazza S. Francesco 7
Siena, Siena 53100
Italy

CERM Foundation ( email )

Via Fiorentina, 1
Siena, Siena 53100
Italy

Alessandro Innocenti

University of Siena - Labsi Experimental Economics Laboratory ( email )

Piazza Mattioli 10
Siena, Siena 53100
Italy

HOME PAGE: http://www.labsi.org

University of Siena - Department of Social, Political and Cognitive Sciences ( email )

Via Roma 56
Siena, Siena I-53100
Italy
39 338 5724318 (Phone)
39 0577 232793 (Fax)

HOME PAGE: http://www.labsi.org/innocenti/

Marco Novarese

University of Piemonte Orientale - Centre for Cognitive Economics ( email )

corso borsalino 44
15100 Alessandria
Italy
+390131/283770 (Phone)
+390131/56808 (Fax)

Do you have a job opening that you would like to promote on SSRN?

Paper statistics

Downloads
21
Abstract Views
299
PlumX Metrics